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“This is and is Not Cressida”: Resisting 
Anthropocentrism in a Shakespeare of 
Things  
 
MOLLY BETH SEREMET  
 
 
n crafting this paper, I have spent much of my time thinking about what this 
project does not want to be, a concern that has only snowballed since the 
paper’s birth in the halcyon days of a pre-Trump 2016. Now, after the post-
election tumult of 2017 and the gathering avalanche of the #metoo movement in 
the first quarter of 2018, I must approach my engagement with our group’s 
anthropocentric concerns from the negative space between this work and the 
paper I will not write. At the outset, I intended to continue the work I began in 
2015 on reciprocal performing objects, delving deeper into an object’s uncanny 
ability to surpass the human in performance.1 That work continues to fascinate 
and beguile me. The potentials for misuse, however, and the implications of 
conflating the human with the object make me personally and professionally 
uncomfortable in our current political climate. Object-oriented work that rippled 
with possibility in 2016 sours in the harsh light of 2018, particularly from my 
personal perspective as a woman, a feminist, and a voice from the alto section of 
the #metoo choir.  
From this positioning inside of a movement that speaks my own personal 
truth, the world around me continues to pulse with cyborg possibility and becoming 
human potential. I am, however, suddenly hyper-aware of the potential of the 
inverse of my work on objects to displace my own tenuous position as a human 
in the world right now. In these trumped-up times, that is, I grow increasingly 
afraid of my own ability to see the becoming human drive in objects given our current 
political administration’s vehemence towards reducing the human to its object 
nature. This exposes a deeply personal anxiety as well, that perhaps I am guilty of 
considering my placement within my own life in object rather than subject-
oriented terms, somehow tacitly inviting (if not outwardly condoning) my 
treatment as such by others. How like Cressida have I become, inviting criticism 
of my behavior as rationalization for treatment I must have brought upon myself. 
After all, in Shakespeare’s play, Ulysses dissects Cressida, noting that, “there's 
language in her eye, her cheek, her lip; Nay, her foot speaks, her wanton spirits 
look out at every joint and motive of her body” (4.5.56-68).2 Out of fear, perhaps, 
Ulysses fractures Cressida’s singular voice into discordant parts as an act of 
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control, a restraining tactic that sticks in my own throat as I write about objects 
and the objectified female character today. 
 This project then is perhaps a primer for (and a cautious defense of) an 
object-oriented feminist theatre practice in terrifyingly anti-human times. Here, I 
rely on theorist Katherine Behar as my companion and guide, who reminds us 
that, “object-oriented feminism’s intervention is to approach all objects from the 
inside-out position of being an object, too.”3 In this work, I embrace the 
prescience of being inside of a #metoo moment to embed myself within the object 
world and allow this paper to give into its compulsion to become object as well. 
In the process, I will argue for the elevation of the object in our human 
consciousness while also critiquing the ethics of my privilege inside an object 




From OOO to OOF  
 
In his provocative book Alien Phenomenology, or, What It’s Like to Be a Thing, 
philosopher and video game designer Ian Bogost observes that, “if we take 
seriously the idea that all objects recede interminably into themselves, then human 
perception becomes just one among many ways that objects might relate. To put 
things at the center of a new metaphysics also requires us to admit that they do 
not exist just for us.”4 Expressed more glibly, things do things whether humans 
notice or not. And, as humans, we are things too. When I originally conceived this 
project, I envisioned that I would begin from this place of inertia, exploring the 
world of Shakespearean noumena; that is, objects that exist without (or in spite 
of) human sense and perception with a particular focus on the intersections 
between human and object actors in Compass Shakespeare Ensemble’s small-scale 
Troilus and Cressida. This production, also referred to as #5bodytroilus, premiered 
in 2016 in Staunton, VA as part of my MFA work at Mary Baldwin University. To 
draw from the vocabulary of object-oriented ontology, I anticipated that this 
project might posit that the creation of a Shakespeare of Things within the form 
of the small-scale anti-heroic narrative magnifies human concerns through 
abstraction of the landscape of the human inside the terrain of the object. When 
grappling with Troilus and Cressida, however, an insurmountable ethical dilemma 
dogged my work; in point of fact, Cressida literally becomes an object throughout 
the pages of the play, passed from one prince to another, kissed in (and by) 
generals, and reduced visually to a glove that appears on stage in the play’s final 
scenes as a token or quasi-memento mori while the character remains offstage (but 
still very much alive). Within Shakespeare’s narrative structure, Cressida offers the 
counterpoint to the notional existence of Helen: Helen’s capture and subsequent 
complicity in remaining with Paris causes the Trojan War but Cressida’s 
displacement becomes the reflecting pool in which the effects of the conflict 
ripple. Inside an object-based exploration, then, replacing Cressida with an object 
simply reinforces her silenced position within her own narrative and this troubling 
paradox became the Trojan Horse that dogged my work. A Troilus and Cressida that 
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excises Cressida from her story simply reinforces what Shakespeare has told us 
from the play’s outset−Cressida is the “and,” the afterthought, the companion 
piece to Troilus’ story who survives the play’s action but is neatly amputated from 
the narrative once her contact with the drama’s male characters recedes into the 
tent(s). As Troilus will detail, Cressida is indeed a pearl, coveted by the play’s male 
characters and bounded within her own oyster-shell, a questionable queen of an 
infinitesimal space. 
An object-oriented ontology risks reinforcing Cressida’s tokenization 
rather than exposing its shortcomings and the ethics of this reduction of the play’s 
central woman halted my original trajectory through this project. Consider, for 
example, that theorist Andrew Cole suggests three rules to frame an object-
oriented ontological engagement, which are particularly relevant in the context of 
theatrical performance. As Cole notes: 
 
First, everything is an object, including you and each of  your 
thoughts. Second, and accordingly, no object relates to any other 
object, because the universe itself  is devoid of  all relation. Why is 
there no relation in the universe? It’s because objects sever relations 
with every other object and withdraw into themselves to become 
self-subsisting, autonomous beings. It’s also because relation is 
typically a human mode of  apprehending, describing, and interacting 
with the world. Given that not every object is a human, though every 
human is an object, you can’t have an object-oriented ontology if  
humans are at the center of  it Such an anthropocentric object-
oriented ontology would be a contradiction in terms, because objects 
are not a means to our ends. They are meaningful whether or not we 
perceive them. Third—and finally—all objects are equal and, 
ontologically speaking, on the same plane. You, a speck of  flea shit, 
an electric chair, and a solar flare are all equal objects.5 
  
In the abstract, this conception makes logical sense. Through the lens of OOO, 
all objects are equal and filled with comparable levels of potential energy for 
action, interpretation, and projection from a human perspective. This way of 
seeing the world aims to close the gap between subject and object and to initiate 
a dialogue between objects in a shared language. As Steven Shaviro expounds, 
“likeness-in-human-terms, if it is projected imaginatively enough, may work to 
dislocate us from the correlationist position of understanding these other entities 
only in terms of their resemblance, and relationship, to ourselves.”6 While OOO 
opens up a productive channel towards an equality of objects, it also forgets that 
in order to see objects as equal, some object positions must first be elevated in order 
to level the ontological field. In terms of privilege, an uneven topography allows 
some objects to be unseen by those at higher elevations and this chasm of visibility 
reifies the distinction between humans and objects rather than blurs its 
boundaries. To put this into practical context, consider the gender-based 
inequalities in current American society with regard to bodily autonomy, equal 
work for equal pay, and protections against sexual harassment and domestic 
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violence. Viewing all human objects as equal in an OOO context requires elevating 
female objects to the same agential level as their male counterparts in order to 
achieve balance. Thus, “objectifying” humans who already occupy object 
positions, including women, minorities, the poor, and the politically vulnerable 
presents an ethical dilemma that needs unpacking, particularly in our current 
American political climate. 
 To un-write an object narrative that disenfranchises the more vulnerable 
objects in a field, the first critical step is to consider that, as Shaw and Meehan 
note, “ . . . objects are force-full—brimming with affect, productive of difference 
and generative of power.”7 In an object-oriented feminism, embracing an object 
position involves a recognition of the affective power of the object to enact change 
and to be seen. While OOO offers to raze the topography of the object landscape, 
OOF first elevates objects lying under the map’s surface before standardizing the 
levels. Behar quantifies this distinction, noting that: 
 
Object-oriented feminism turns the position of  philosophy inside-
out to study objects while being an object oneself. Such self-
implication allows OOF to develop three important aspects of  
feminist thinking in the philosophy of  things: politics, in which OOF 
engages with histories of  treating certain humans (women, people 
of  color, and the poor) as objects; erotics, in which OOF employs 
humor to foment unseemly entanglements between things; and 
ethics, in which OOF refuses to make grand philosophical truth 
claims, instead staking a modest ethical position that arrives at being 
“in the right” even if  it means being “wrong.”8 
 
Here, the human intentionally inhabits the object position in order to bridge the 
ontological divide between subject and object and through this purposeful act, the 
object position becomes a perspective of empowerment and not one of further 
disenfranchisement in a semiotic sense. As Kayla Anderson urges, “reinvoking a 
sense of wonder toward the nonhuman, though it might be mined in 
anthropomorphism, nevertheless instigates a heightened sense of attentiveness 
between people and things”9 that enacts more sustainable power dynamics that 
support rather than denigrate more vulnerable objects.  
Much as Troilus and Cressida’s events circumvent the climactic introduction 
of the Trojan Horse, my work on #5bodytroilus actively avoids the easy 
introduction of a stand-in surrogate object for the play’s titular woman and instead 
focuses on strategies of object interaction that amplify Cressida’s agential shifts in 
Shakespeare’s text. This approach draws on an imaginative and even fanciful 
perspective on objects but in so doing, offers an invitation for both identification 
and elevation of the object in performance. A possible trajectory for un-writing 
objects begins in this act of equalizing, in embracing the potential of a feminist 
lens on object orientation to contextualize and humanize specifically the 
objectified woman inside the space of the theatre and in larger context, within the 
frame of the world at large. 
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Inside of Shakespeare’s play, the men of this martial world ask us often 
to see Cressida in discrete fragments rather than as a unified whole. Troilus 
conjures her first for the audience, lamenting that her uncle Pandarus baits him by 
dangling her individual attributes, torturing him with visions of “her eyes, her hair, 
her cheek, her gait, her voice” (1.1.51). To Troilus, she is a catalogue of tantalizing 
parts, each more tempting than the last and too slippery to take in hand at once. 
Troilus cannot grasp Cressida entirely but can snare her as an object: “her bed is 
India; there she lies, a pearl” (1.1.96). Thus, Troilus clutches Cressida’s pearl for 
himself, a greedy action afforded to him through his skillful manipulation of her 
person into separate parts before the audience has met her in the flesh. In this 
way, Shakespeare permits Troilus to emblazon Cressida but mobilizes this 
Petrarchan-style elucidation of an adored woman’s discrete parts to break her 
down for easy digestion rather than to magnify her holistic perfection. In 
performance, the easy choice is to take Troilus’s reckoning as Cressida’s truth and 
to offer up a women who is simply there for the taking. In the bright light of our 
contemporary moment, however, might we instead add a further layer of nacre to 
Cressida and render her a little less schuckable?  
 In remediating Cressida’s disenfranchisement within her own narrative, 
we must first consider precisely what kind of object relations the text allows and 
further, create a taxonomy that can support her status in a performative context. 
Here, precision in language is tantamount; after all, in cultivating an object-
oriented perspective, we inevitably unearth a myriad of terms that all aim to 
encapsulate a facet of human-object relation. In developing a performative 
approach to vibrant matter, terms like artifact, souvenir, relic, token, memento mori, 
and totem each imply distinct responsibilities for practical application. Consider, 
for example, the varied contexts in which an object becomes a token. Curiously, 
this word simultaneously conjures images of a nominal impersonal gift, the 
singular representative of a group as a whole, and a physical voucher that can be 
exchanged for a good or service. To consider this from an OOF perspective is to 
not only acknowledge this multiplicity of meanings but to allow the iteration of 
language and human perception to saturate the work entirely.  
To unpack this, consider what happens if we name Cressida as token 
within the narrative of Troilus and Cressida; in point of fact, this label amplifies her 
power within the text because it obscures her vanishing point. If Cressida is a token, 
she cannot simply be a whore because the specificity of a tokenized object 
interaction requires her to be both obviously insignificant and of a perceptibly 
appreciable value that she can vouch for an object or service in exchange. In the 
alternative, naming Cressida as relic allows her to become bodily metonymic 
through the performance of her own history, gaining larger significance because 
of her surrogacy within the oyster-shell of her own story. These distinctions (or 
perhaps, slips) in language are subtle but by no means pedantic because they 
encapsulate the trouble humans have in approaching and quantifying relations 
with the object world, where the uncanny nature of the object holds the human at 
bay even as the human controls or operates the object in question. Rather than 
dodging this unease with the human’s position in relation to the object, an OOF-
driven perspective harnesses it to make the best of the shifts and rifts in language 
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The Taxonomy of Objects in OOF 
 
Through OOF-tinted lenses then, the place of the object within feminist 
performance praxis touches the world of the token, the totem, the artifact, and 
even the significant relic that stands in for or activates a revered space of memory 
or distilled emotion inside of performance. Holding objects up in the context of 
each of these specific human-led paradigms imbues the object’s object position 
with power rather than impotence, lending a perceptible subjectivity to the object 
in question. In a sense, OOF asks the audience to creatively and imaginatively 
elevate the onstage object to the human plane of subjectivity and to begin to 
understand that the inverse paradigm is also possible, effective, and force-full. As 
cultural anthropologist Nadia Seremetakis explains, “the artifact, as the bearer of 
sensory multiplicity is a catchment zone of perceptions, a lens through which the 
senses can be exported from their other side: matter as both the terminus of 
human actions and the carrier of surplus meaning of those actions. Thus it is an 
unrecognized double of the human body.”10 Elevating an object from OOO’s sea-
level to OOF’s peak, then, invites the viewer (or, in a theatrical context, the 
audience) to do the work of interpreting the performance’s multiple meanings, 
invoking the object as double of the human. To clarify this paradigm shift, 
consider Behar’s onomatopoeic assessment that: 
 
As its awestruck acronym might imply, OOO’s tone often appears 
somewhat too elated by discovering a universe composed of  objects. 
What is more, OOO seems to relish, in the idea that humans too are 
objects, a sense of  liberation from the shackles of  subjectivity 
especially from the “unreal” illusions of  correlationism. Finding 
neither of  these positions tenable, OOF therefore positions itself  as 
a friendly if  pointed rejoinder, reminding this flourishing 
philosophical discussion first, that object-oriented approaches to the 
world are practiced in disciplines outside philosophy, and second, 
that all too many humans are well aware of  being objects without 
finding cause to celebrate in that reality. Thus, by swapping OOO’s 
gasp for a gutsier grunt, OOF aims to inject feminism into this 
discourse, but without dismissing these notions that, in fact, are 
essential for contemporary activism.11 
 
In contrast to the passive gawking encouraged by the coo of OOO, the gut-punch 
of OOF then jostles the audience into inserting themselves into the frame of the 
object to peer out and survey the terrain of the world outside. This work perhaps 
approaches Peggy Phelan’s assertion that “representation reproduces the Other as 
the Same”12 in a generative sense in which a search for the same is not a push for 
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hegemony but rather an invitation to intersectionality, a concept critical to both 
feminism at large and the potential of OOF in performance practice. In a sense, 
this work promotes the creation of the intersectional artifact, a focal point for an 
audience that preserves the autonomy and individual subject position of each 
audience member within the object. 
 This individuality of both experience and perception is a critical tenant of 
OOF as differentiated from OOO; while OOO aims to set the table with a 
collection of interesting and equally relevant objects, OOF aims to stage the table 
as sufficient in and of itself as a sensorial encapsulation of every dinner, every 
argument, every letter penned on the table’s surface for every individual spectator 
(or perhaps spect-actor). Embracing OOF signals a turn towards valuing the trace 
of the human within the object, and illuminating the object’s role in shaping the 
larger (human) narratives it figures in, a metaphorical parallel to the forensic 
remnants of the human held in fingerprints and biometric samples. In his research 
on ventriloquism, theorist Stephen Conner pushes this paradigm further to also 
argue for the unique and individual inner life of the object in this thought 
experiment. As Conner explains: 
 
One might call such a conception of the body’s relationship to its 
various environments a conception of “implicated space.” In such a 
conception, the insides and outsides of things are not so powerfully 
distinguished as they are in later conceptions; insides and outsides 
change places, and produce each other reciprocally.13 
  
Thus, to return to the table example, OOF asks that we prize the rich interiority 
of the table itself on equal footing with the human because the table is engaged in 
the process of becoming human as the human audience imagines becoming object in 
solidarity with it. Boundaries here are mutable and the meniscus between the 
object and the human teeters and spills over with performative potential. This 
paradigm of the breached or potentially breachable boundary dogs both OOO 
and OOF, but an object-oriented feminism allows us to see the possibility in this 
disconnect if the object itself is a catchment zone for memory, of both the small 
and large varieties. Curiously, this object-oriented process mirrors the manner in 
which humans hold and process memory inside the human brain; as Seremetakis 
explains, “the memory of one sense is stored in another: that of tactility in sound, 
of hearing in taste, of sight in sound. Sensory memory is a form of storage. Storage 
is always the embodiment and conservation of experiences, persons and matter in 
vessels of alterity.”14 In the context of OOF, the alterity of the marginalized 
subject position parallels the otherness inherent in a practice of inhabiting the 
object position to approach a dialogue with the thing itself. 
 To initiate this type of dialogue, it is important to question, however, 
precisely what function an object serves in a memorial context. As noted 
previously, objects embody a physical disposition towards containing memory. 
Consider, for example, the function of the souvenir to become a touchstone for a 
destination or a fragment of human lived experience. To draw on a personal 
example, my husband proposed to me on the Wonder Wheel because Coney 
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Island is the place I love the most and we spent the rest of that day collecting 
souvenirs to commemorate the place of our engagement: pink and green plastic 
frogs won from the arcade, broken shells, a stack of Zoltar’s fortunes, and a 
“Burlesque at the Beach” pin. While my garnet engagement ring stands in for the 
act of our engagement to the world at large, my collection of amusement park tat 
serves as a more effective vector to reliving the experience of being engaged, 
conjuring memories of that particular day superimposed over everything I hold 
dear about the place itself. For this reason, these objects sit in prominent places in 
my home and I encounter them (and the memories they hold) everyday as I move 
through my current temporality. I offer this sentimental example to demonstrate 
the uncanniness of the object’s double life, existing as both a mnemonic device 
and memory itself in the same breath.  
The field of object-oriented ontology frames this duality through a 
taxonomic distinction which divides the object field into two sides: the real object 
and the sensual object, in which real objects are those which are understood to be 
assemblages of identifiable components (a piston engine, a mailbox, a wristwatch) 
while sensual objects are those which layer an experience over the object’s 
component parts (the tidal pull of the ocean, the drag of a high-powered 
automobile). Theorist Graham Harman pushes this distinction further by inserting 
the human into the taxonomic quantification, suggesting that, “although we never 
touch real objects, we always touch sensual objects. Sensual objects would not 
even exist if they did not exist for me, or for some other agent that expends its 
energy in taking them seriously”.15 To return to my Coney Island example, the 
trinkets I brought home on my engagement day are sensual objects in a way that 
my engagement ring is not because the souvenirs I gathered are haptic touchstones 
for the experience of a special and deeply personal day while my ring is the real 
token that performs my coupled status to the external world.  
 As OOO suggests, objects with sensual qualities can be said to be both 
relational and relative in memorial terms. In grappling with this tension, Harman 
concludes that, “objects are units that both display and conceal a multitude of 
traits.”16 While the Coney Island example I shared illustrates this duality nicely, I 
grow increasingly troubled by Harman’s aggressive language in framing object 
potentiality. His recognition of object agency strays into metaphors of 
exploitation, using the duality of concealment and revelation as evidence of an 
object’s promiscuity or ability to tease the human. This move towards shaming the 
object in order to crack its veneer smacks of manipulation in deeply disturbing 
ways as it promotes the harvesting of an object’s desired sensual qualities at the 
expense of the object itself in a parallel of human gender-based violence and 
privation. As a corrective, we might harmonize with the resounding #metoo 
chorus reverberating in our present moment to shift the tenor of our interactions 
with objects to an object-oriented feminist tune that is more inclusive and 
thoughtful in terms of the object’s consent. 
An OOF-based approach might instead begin by examining the ethics 
and perhaps the “rights” of the sensual object in theatrical practice. This ethical 
emphasis is necessary to make reparations for a human perspective of exploitation 
towards an object’s sensual potential, in which we ask what an object can (and 
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will) do for us. Adopting an OOF approach might look and feel more like 
obtaining an object’s informed consent to relations with the human in order to 
ensure the mutuality of the coupled encounter. I recognize that my language here 
is loaded in a sociopolitical context with regard to rape culture, bodily autonomy, 
and the policing of the female body and in fact, this gendered linguistic turn is 
critical to an OOF approach. An object ethic in performance must begin with 
recognition and acknowledgment of the privilege that offers elevation to some 
subjects at the expense of the rest of the object field. In embracing OOF as a 
corrective lens on top of OOO, then, we might approach the object on even 
footing. A shift to OOF offers the radical potential to step away from exploitation 
of the object to serve human ends and instead, through constructive empathy with 
the object, raze the artificial divide through mutual respect for the sensual qualities 





If  we allow that OOF provides a useful vocabulary through which to understand 
the interconnectedness of  the thing and the human from inside of  the object 
position, how do we stage this paradigm effectively and ethically in 2018? And why 
collide the creation of  the intersectional artifact/token/souvenir with 
Shakespeare, the ultimate dramatic thing in our collective consciousness? After all, 
Shakespeare certainly cannot escape censure in #metoo terms for fetishizing 
women through a persistently masculine lens and offering respite from the perils 
of  being female primarily through the adoption of  masculine things including male 
dress, male-coded behaviors, and male husbands. Inside of  Troilus and Cressida, 
however, Shakespeare creates in Cressida a female character who lacks respite 
specifically because of  her contact with men (and their things, presumably). As 
Tina Packer notes, “She [Cressida] knows it is men's sexual desire that makes 
women ‘angels’ before they have been able to possess them; once possessed, 
women are ‘things.’”17 Passed from hand to hand, Cressida loses currency in each 
exchange, debased by every man who touches her. How then do we address this 
creation of Shakespeare’s from an object-oriented feminist perspective? 
We might begin by considering Lehmann’s position that, “theatre that 
rejects the dramatic model can retrieve the possibility of  returning to things their 
value and to the human actors the experience of  'thing-ness’ that has become alien 
to them.”18 In the space of  the theatre, we have the opportunity to experiment 
with approaching the object on its own terms to frame the encounter through a 
push for parity with the whole object rather than an easy exploitation of  the 
object’s sensual qualities. It is worth pausing here to note, however, that the 
strategies of  approaching objects I have discussed from both OOO and OOF 
directions employ language and metaphors of  sight, privileging the role of  the 
visual encounter with the object rather than a haptic or experiential approach. To 
counter this implicit privilege, object performances might create a paradigm in 
which the object invites the human to experience it through a multiplicity of  sense-
based encounters. Drawing on the principals of  object-oriented feminism might 
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offer productive ground rules to frame the haptic encounter in ethically sound 
terms, respecting the agency of  the objects with which we perform.   
While objects may withdraw into themselves by nature, the human 
inclination to draw closer to the object invites the layering of  a feminist perspective 
in order to not so much understand a thing but to observe and touch the thingness of  
the thing in real time. If  employed in a way that elevates the object rather than 
stripping it for its component parts, this can be a resonant paradigm in 
performative practice as demonstrated by Compass Shakespeare Ensemble’s 
engagement with Troilus and Cressida. After all, Shakespeare’s Cressida is neither 
immigrant nor refugee but rather prisoner and spoil of  war, leaving her perpetually 
stranded in the middle ground of  belonging, passed from hand to hand as martial 
currency. Thus, keeping Cressida constantly onstage in both human and object 
form used interchangeably and also in combination with each other keeps her 
from performing the disappearance that Shakespeare scripts for her. Instead, 
Cressida becomes force-full in both the world of  the play and the consciousness 
of  the audience. Applying an object-oriented feminist approach to approximate 
this experience fractures the text by unseating the primacy of  the subject to give 
way to a non-hegemonic landscape of  fellow objects, ripe with theatrical potential. 
To place this into perspective, let us circle back to Bogost’s queries on the 
place of  wonder within object-oriented practice. We might echo his way of  seeing 
that, “the world is simply full of  interesting, curious things, all living their own 
alien lives”19 without also immediately demanding that the object interiority we 
discover be put into service to fulfill our human desires. In this way, an actor, a 
piece of  weaponry, and an audience member can meet on the performative plane 
without risk to anyone’s life and without sacrificing the excitement of  the 
performative encounter. From a personal perspective, the tremors of  this analogy 
did not truly rock me until I tried to process my own unease with the results of  
the 2016 presidential election. Prior to that historical moment, I felt far less 
conflicted about Bogost’s invitation to fancy with regard to objects than I do now, 
perhaps because my relative privilege insulated me enough to agree that objects 
are indeed wonder-full. In 2018, however, I feel more as though I am looking up 
at the object rather than reaching down for it from a height. As a result, I am 
approaching objects with far more wariness and respect these days, perhaps 
because I am all too aware that I have more in common with the object in the eye 
of  this political storm than I am comfortable admitting. In the past few months, I 
feel as though I have undergone a becoming Cressida and OOF offers a productive 
lens through which to harness the inertia of  that transformation for productive 
and ethically responsible change in my function as scholar, teacher, and theatre-
maker. As Troilus’s thoroughly impersonal language reminds us, “this is and is not 
Cressida” (5.2.153) and Cressida’s only agency to exert change and to protect 
herself  on the precipice of  becoming object within her narrative rests on the force-
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 1. Here, I refer to my M. Litt thesis work on the Shakespeare and Performance program 
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